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Replacing Development: An Afro-Communal 
Approach to Global Justice 
Thaddeus Metz 
Abstract: In this article, I consider whether there are values intrinsic to development 
theory and practice that are dubious in light of a characteristically African ethic. In 
particular, I focus on what a certain philosophical interpretation of the sub-Saharan value 
of communion entails for appraising development, drawing two major conclusions. One is 
that a majority of the criticisms that have been made of development by those sympathetic 
to African values are weak; I argue that, given the value of communion, development 
should not be rejected because it is essentially, say, overly materialistic and scientistic, or 
insufficiently spiritual and local. The second conclusion, however, is that three criticisms of 
development are strong from the perspective of Afro-communalism and are particularly 
powerful when set in that context. I argue that development theory and practice are 
characteristically anthropocentric, individualist and technocratic, and that a reading of the 
sub-Saharan value of communion provides a unitary foundation for rejecting these features 
and for grounding an alternative, more relational approach to social progress and to what 
justice demands from the West in relation to Africa. 
1. Introduction 
There are three salient conceptions of progress in the modern Western 
tradition that intellectuals and policy makers have often invoked to 
appraise the standing of Euro-America-Australasia and rest of the world 
in relation to it, namely, meta-narrative, economic growth and 
development. Although the latter one grew out of the former two, I focus 
strictly on it here, enquiring into development’s plausibility as an 
account of what sub-Saharan societies ought to be doing and of how 
Western ones should be helping them.  
Those sympathetic to Africa have often criticized development for 
serving nefarious functions, particularly for legitimating Western 
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domination of Africa1 and for expressing an attitude of superiority on 
the part of the West.2 Sometimes critics have also contended that 
development has failed on its own terms to alleviate poverty in Africa.3 I 
believe that while these criticisms are plausibly true of development in 
practice, they do not target the heart of development theory. In 
principle, there could be a form of development that would neither serve 
to facilitate Western domination of Africa, nor express Western 
arrogance over it, nor fail to reach its own ends. Just imagine, for 
example, that African governments successfully undertook development 
on their own. Would there still be a moral problem with this sort of 
development?4  
In this article I defend an affirmative answer to this question. I argue 
that there are value judgments central to both development theory and 
practice that are dubious in light of a characteristically African ethic. 
More specifically, I focus on what a certain philosophical interpretation 
of the sub-Saharan value of communion entails for appraising 
development, drawing two major conclusions. One is that a majority of 
                                                     
1 E.g., Arturo Escobar, ‘Imagining a Post-Development Era?’, Social Text 31/32 (1992): 20-
56; Majid Rahnema, ‘Towards Post-Development’, in Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree 
(eds), The Post-Development Reader (London: Zed Books, 1997), 377-403; and Eiman Zein-
Elabdin, ‘Postcoloniality and Development: Development as a Colonial Discourse’, in 
Lansana Keita (ed.), Philosophy and African Development Theory and Practice (Dakar: 
CODESRIA, 2011), 215-230. 
2 For just one clear statement, see Aram Ziai, ‘Development Discourse and Its Critics’, in 
Aram Ziai (ed.), Exploring Post-development (New York: Routledge, 2007), 3-17 at 8. 
3 For instance, Rahnema, ‘Towards Post-Development’, 378-379, 391; James Ferguson, 
‘Development and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho’, in Majid Rahnema and Victoria 
Bawtree (eds), The Post-Development Reader (London: Zed Books, 1997), 223-233; Sally 
Matthews, ‘Post-development Theory and the Question of Alternatives: A View from 
Africa’, Third World Quarterly 25 (2004): 373-384; Kwesi Kwaa Prah, ‘Culture: The Missing 
Link in Development Planning in Africa’, in Lansana Keita (ed.), Philosophy and African 
Development Theory and Practice (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2011), 155-168; and Ewelina Róża 
Lubieniecka, ‘Does Post-development Theory Find Alternatives to Westernization of 
International Relations? African Perspective’, paper presented at the 8th Pan-European 
Conference on International Relations (2013). 
4 Setting aside Claude Ake’s point that development-talk has also served to legitimate the 
domination of African elites over their people in his Democracy and Development in Africa 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996). 
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the criticisms that have been made of development by those sympathetic 
to African values are weak; I argue that, given the value of communion, 
development should not be rejected because it is essentially, say, overly 
materialistic and scientistic, or insufficiently spiritual and local.  
The second conclusion, however, is that three criticisms of 
development are strong from the perspective of Afro-communalism and 
are particularly powerful when set in that context. I argue that 
development theory and practice are anthropocentric, individualist and 
technocratic, and that a reading of the sub-Saharan value of communion 
provides a unitary foundation for rejecting these features and for 
grounding an alternative, more relational approach to social progress 
and to what justice demands from the West in relation to Africa. 
Note that my main aim is to apply a certain Afro-communal value to 
the concept of development. I lack the space to defend this value 
systematically as a ground of public morality,5 and must rest content with 
merely providing a prima facie motivation for that. In addition, 
although I do offer reasons to think that the concept of communion has 
a sub-Saharan pedigree, I cannot here provide a thorough reckoning of 
why I believe the ‘African’ label for it is apt, particularly in the face of 
some similarities with values of other indigenous peoples.6  
In the following, I begin by explaining what I mean by ‘development’, 
clarifying what it is that I am evaluating in this article (Section 2), after 
which I advance the Afro-communal value that I use to do so (Section 3). 
Then, taking communion for granted, I invoke it to demonstrate that 
others who have accepted characteristically sub-Saharan values (or the 
                                                     
5 Which I have sought to do in, for instance, Thaddeus Metz, ‘Ubuntu as a Moral Theory 
and Human Rights in South Africa’, African Human Rights Law Journal 11 (2011): 532-559, 
‘Developing African Political Philosophy: Moral-Theoretic Strategies’, Philosophia Africana 
14 (2012): 61-83, and ‘The Western Ethic of Care or an Afro-Communitarian Ethic?: 
Specifying the Right Relational Morality’, Journal of Global Ethics 9 (2013): 77-92. 
6 On which see, e.g., George Silberbauer, ‘Ethics in Small-Scale Societies’, in Peter Singer 
(ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 14-28. For an account of how I 
believe geographical labels such as ‘African’ are plausibly used, see Thaddeus Metz, ‘How 
the West Was One: The Western as Individualist, the African as Communitarian’, 
Educational Philosophy and Theory 47 (2015): 1175-1184. 
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values of indigenous peoples more broadly) have sometimes criticized 
development for several reasons that are weak (Section 4). Next, I show 
that communion entails that three of the criticisms, however, are strong, 
that it provides a unitary foundation for the most telling objections to 
development (Section 5). I conclude by briefly considering some 
implications of rejecting development-talk and creating a new 
vocabulary for just social change (Section 6). 
2. What Is Development? 
In seeking to answer this question, I am not trying to articulate a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept of development 
(though I will not complain if I have by chance done so). I will be content 
to have instead spelled out features characteristic of development theory 
and practice.  
For much of the post-independence era in Africa, development had 
been premised on the aim of indefinite economic growth,7 which was 
powerfully criticized for three major reasons, namely, for being 
inconsistent with ecological concerns, insufficiently related to people’s 
quality of life, and unconcerned with the distribution of wealth, viz., 
towards the worst-off. However, these days standard development theory 
and practice require environmental sustainability, expected 
improvement in people’s welfare (often cashed out in terms of needs or 
capabilities), and a concern for who receives the benefits. Any plausible 
account of the nature of development should not be overly narrow for 
placing economic growth at its centre; the latter should be understood to 
be merely one, unattractive form that the former once took. 
Conversely, it would be a mistake to construe the concept of 
development too broadly, relative to my aim in this article, which is to 
target a certain Western conception of social progress. So, it will not do to 
think of development as merely ‘purposive (teleological) growth’ where 
                                                     
7 Although this is well known, one might see the trenchant analysis in Cornelius 
Castoriadis, ‘Reflections on “Rationality” and “Development”’, repr. in Thesis Eleven 10/11 
(1984/85): 18-36. 
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‘the goal of development is greater human, material, technological and 
cultural welfare’.8 This analysis of the concept of development does not 
uniquely pick out the particular sorts of practices that have been 
undertaken in Africa and recommended for it over the past 60 years or so.  
To make headway, consider some representative examples of the way 
that the word ‘development’ has been used recently in respect of sub-
Saharan Africa. Quintessential instances include the World Bank, the 
United Nations or a Western government enabling farmers to 
participate on the global market by reducing tariffs or enabling them to 
access seeds, offering training in macroeconomic planning and fiscal 
management to government employees, deploying new technologies, 
such as cell phone applications, to enable people to participate in the 
banking system, educating the police about human rights and gender 
issues, helping primary school teachers develop modules that will foster 
literacy and numeracy, and providing electronic stock management 
systems to medical clinics.9 Although development has often had a non-
African agent driving it, that is not a necessary condition, as there have 
of course been times when African states themselves, as well as 
parastatals and NGOs based in them, have done so, though typically in 
‘partnership’ with a better resourced external body. 
Using these examples as a springboard, I suggest that the following 
captures much of what is central to development, construed as a Western 
conception of progress that has often been applied to Africa and taken on 
board by African institutions: the quest to improve non-Western people’s 
standard of living and to protect their human rights, as exemplified by the 
West, principally through changes to state policy and corporate practice 
that are scientifically informed and typically involve sophisticated 
technology, improved efficiency and the adoption of impersonal norms.  
                                                     
8 Godfrey Tangwa, ‘Philosophy, Democracy and Development’, in Lansana Keita (ed.), 
Philosophy and African Development Theory and Practice (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2011), 177-195 at 
177, 178.  
9 These examples were largely taken from the website listing the International Development 
Projects run by the Canadian government, http://www.international.gc.ca/development-
developpement/aidtransparency-transparenceaide/browser-banque.aspx?lang=eng. 
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One implication of this analysis is that the Western world by 
definition cannot develop. That might in fact be welcome, since the 
discourse invariably distinguishes between ‘developed’ and 
‘undeveloped’ or (more politically correct) ‘developing’ countries. 
However, if the reader believes that development could take place in 
Europe, North America and Australasia, then one could either remove 
mention of ‘non-Western’ people as the intended beneficiaries and speak 
merely of ‘people’ in general, or speak of ‘mainly’ non-Western people 
as the ones meant to benefit. The crucial point is that the non-Western 
parts of the world are supposed to ‘catch up’ to the Western part. 
I leave further refinements of this characterization of development to 
other philosophers. I submit that it has the merits of avoiding being 
either too narrow or too broad, successfully picking out a Western 
approach to social progress that has been salient since the independence 
of sub-Saharan countries from colonial powers. The next issue to address 
is why one might reasonably find it objectionable. Would it not be ideal 
for these countries to come closer to the milk and honey conditions of 
the West? What in the world is wrong with projects of the sort 
adumbrated above? 
3. A Philosophical Interpretation of the African Value of Communion 
Although some philosophical articulations of sub-Saharan values take life-
force10 or the common good11 as basic, or appeal to invisible agents such 
as ancestors and the not-yet-born,12 I have argued elsewhere that a secular 
and relational conception of them is particularly attractive, at least for a 
                                                     
10 E.g., Noah Dzobo, ‘Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors, and God’, in Kwasi 
Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye (eds), Person and Community (Washington, DC: Council for 
Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992), 223-240; and Laurenti Magesa, African 
Religion: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997). 
11 Most prominently Kwame Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the 
African Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
12 E.g., Bénézet Bujo, ‘Differentiations in African Ethics’, in William Schweiker (ed.), The 
Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 423-437; and 
Munyaradzi Felix Murove, ‘The Shona Ethic of Ukama with Reference to the Immortality 
of Values’, The Mankind Quarterly 48 (2007): 179-189. 
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global audience of philosophers, policy-makers and activists.13 Roughly, 
from this perspective, communal relationships with human persons and 
certain animals are what merit pursuit for their own sake. In this section, I 
expound this ethic, applying it only in the following sections.  
My favoured philosophical rendition of African values is grounded on 
relational ideas such as these, advanced by a variety of sub-Saharan 
thinkers:  
Every member is expected to consider him/herself an integral part of the 
whole and to play an appropriate role towards achieving the good of all.14 
Harmony is (to be) achieved through close and sympathetic social relations 
within the group.15 
The fundamental meaning of community is the sharing of an overall way of 
life, inspired by the notion of the common good.16 
(T)he purpose of our life is community-service and community-
belongingness.17 
If you asked ubuntu (the Nguni word for personhood or virtue—ed.) 
advocates and philosophers: What principles inform and organise your life? 
… the answers would express commitment to the good of the community in 
which their identities were formed, and a need to experience their lives as 
bound up in that of their community.18 
These quotations are of interest for two reasons. One is that they suggest 
that a certain kind of relationship is to be pursued as an end, not merely 
as a means.19 Another is that they specify the nature of this relationship, 
                                                     
13 For some key papers, see note 5 above. 
14 Segun Gbadegesin, African Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 65. 
15 Yvonne Mokgoro, ‘Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa’, Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 1 (1998): 15-26 at 17. 
16 Kwame Gyekye, Beyond Cultures; Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, Volume III (Washington, 
DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2004), 16. 
17 Pantaleon Iroegbu, ‘Beginning, Purpose and End of Life’, in Pantaleon Iroegbu and 
Anthony Echekwube (eds), Kpim of Morality Ethics (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 
2005), 440-445 at 442. 
18 Gessler Muxe Nkondo, ‘Ubuntu as a Public Policy in South Africa’, International Journal of 
African Renaissance Studies 2 (2007): 88-100 at 91. 
19 I acknowledge that Gyekye is committed to denying this, given that he believes the 
common good is foundational.  
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in terms of two logically distinct facets.20 On the one hand, there is what 
I call ‘identifying with’ others, that is, considering oneself part of the 
whole, being close, sharing a way of life, belonging and being bound up 
with others, and, on the other, there is ‘exhibiting solidarity’ with them, 
i.e., achieving the good of all, being sympathetic, advancing the common 
good, servicing and being committed to others’ good.  
I call the combination of identity and solidarity ‘communion’ (or 
sometimes ‘harmony’). I abjure the word ‘community’, in part because it is 
used in a variety of ways and in part because it might suggest the (Western) 
communitarian view that appropriate norms are determined by a group’s 
attitudes or culture. In contrast, communion is meant to be an objective 
standard by which to determine whether a group’s norms are appropriate, 
whether it has moral reason to change its attitudes or culture.  
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic Representation of Communion 
                                                     
20 Which I first distinguished and reconstructed in Thaddeus Metz, ‘Toward an African 
Moral Theory’, Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2007): 321-341; for a somewhat revised 
version, see Isaac Ukpokolo (ed.), Themes, Issues and Problems in African Philosophy 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 97-119.  
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Supposing that communal relationship, as above, merits pursuit for its 
own sake in some way, the question arises as to which beings merit it. 
Roughly, with whom or what should one commune?21 By my 
philosophical reconstruction, beings have a full moral status (a dignity) if 
they are capable of being both subjects and objects of communion, that 
is, if they can exhibit identity and solidarity with another and another 
can exhibit identity and solidarity with them. Normal human persons fit 
this description. There is some moral reason to commune with such 
beings, if they have not misused their capacity to commune or if relating 
discordantly to them (roughly, with subordination and harm) is not 
necessary to rebut their wrongdoing.  
Other kinds of beings have a partial moral status, insofar they are 
capable of being merely the object of communion, that is, if they cannot 
exhibit identity and solidarity with us but we can exhibit identity and 
solidarity with them. Animals ‘higher’ than insects, arachnids and the 
like can be objects of communion with us. When it comes to birds, mice, 
cats, dogs, giraffes, lions, elephants and apes, we can enjoy a sense of 
togetherness with them, foster their ends, do what is likely to make their 
lives go well, and do so out of sympathy and for their own sake. There is 
some moral reason to commune with such beings, although less reason 
than with those beings that have a dignity.  
The further question of precisely how to respond to the value of 
communion is complicated, and is one I do not need to explore in detail 
here in order to appraise development. In a nutshell, I reject a 
consequentialist prescription to maximize communal relationships, and 
instead advocate a deontological principle according to which one 
should respect beings insofar as they are capable of communion. Such 
respect will mean, in part, communing with them and helping them to 
commune, but it will not mean, say, acting discordantly towards 
innocents even if doing so would promote communion in the long run.  
                                                     
21 For a systematic articulation and defence of the following answer, see Thaddeus Metz, 
‘An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism’, 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2012): 387-402. 
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In other work I have argued that this philosophical interpretation of 
the sub-Saharan value of communion easily entails and plausibly explains 
a variety of salient practices amongst indigenous sub-Saharan peoples, 
ones that have some intuitive moral pull even for those outside this 
tradition. For example, it naturally accounts for their: recurrent search for 
consensus in decision-making; inclination towards reconciliation when 
responding to wrongdoing; tendency to hold land in common and to 
avoid great inequalities of wealth; and disposition to accord animals a 
partial moral standing, one lower than humans but greater than plants.22  
I lack the space to discuss further the African credentials of this 
principle, and must focus on its prima facie plausibility as a normative 
ground of public policy. Whereas the utilitarian believes that institutions 
ought to serve the function of enhancing subjective well-being, the 
Kantian believes they should protect and enhance people’s autonomy, 
and the capabilities theorist believes they should ensure that people have 
the ability to function in objectively valuable ways, the adherent to 
communion contends (roughly) that institutions ought to commune and 
enable others to do so. The latter approach entails that conditions such 
as these are to be prized: a state that cares for the quality of life of its 
residents; a business that is willing to forgo some profits so as to 
strengthen ties with stakeholders; a populace that is cohesive in the sense 
of enjoying a national identity and being disposed to cooperate across 
ethnic lines; and a household in which marriages are evenhanded and 
stable and in which children are reared with wisdom. From this Afro-
communal perspective, roughly speaking, ‘immorality is the word or 
deed which undermines fellowship’,23 i.e., wrongness is more or less 
discordant behaviour that treats innocent parties as separate and 
inferior, subordinates them, is expected to harm them, and is done 
consequent to indifference or cruelty. This ethic, too, merits 
consideration when thinking about how to organize a society.  
                                                     
22 See, e.g., ‘Toward an African Moral Theory’, ‘Developing African Political Philosophy’ 
and ‘An African Theory of Moral Status’. 
23 Peter Kasenene, Religious Ethics in Africa (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998), 21. 
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4. Weak Criticisms of Development  
In the rest of this article, I take for granted the prescription to treat 
others with respect insofar as they are capable of being party to 
communal relationships. Supposing that communion is key, it follows 
that several of the major criticisms that have been made of development 
in the literature lack force. This is true even for those critics who would 
describe themselves as ‘Africanists’. From my perspective, they have not 
honed in on respects in which development truly undermines fellowship.  
4.1. Too Little Spirituality?  
Some adherents to characteristically African values have criticized the 
neglect by development theory and practice of ‘spiritual’ considerations, 
such as the inclination to see invisible agents, say, ancestors or God, in 
the world. As one African scholar has put it, ‘(T)he alliance of progress, 
science and technology leads to social and spiritual bankruptcy. Having 
objectified nature and people, God too becomes impersonal’.24  
It is true that a concern to foster cell-phone banking, improve supply 
chain management and facilitate trade on the world market means a 
neglect of what traditional sub-Saharans might consider holy. However, I 
do not believe that this necessarily indicates a moral shortcoming with 
development. A strict focus on the perceptible (or what Westerners 
would call the ‘physical’) need not involve any failure to commune, as 
construed in the previous section.  
There can sometimes be secular reasons for a concept of social 
progress to include imperceptible (‘spiritual’) elements.25 For example, if 
                                                     
24 Harvey Sindima, ‘Community of Life’, The Ecumenical Review 41 (1989): 537-551 at 542. 
See also Ratan Basu, ‘Why the Human Development Index Does Not Measure Up to 
Ancient Indian Standards’, Cultural Mandala 6 (2005), http://www.international-
relations.com/CM6-2WB/HDI-Ancient-India.htm; and Aram Ziai, ‘Post-Development 
Concepts? Buen Vivir, Ubuntu and Degrowth’, paper presented at the Degrowth Conference 
in Leipzig (2014), 2, http://www.degrowth.de/en/catalogue-entry/post-development-
concepts-buen-vivir-ubuntu-and-degrowth/.  
25 For considerations beyond those mentioned here see Thaddeus Metz, ‘Gross National 
Happiness: A Philosophical Appraisal’, Ethics and Social Welfare 8 (2014): 218-232 at 223-
225. 
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many people have exhibited identity and solidarity in a religious way 
over a long span of time, then considerations of communion entail that 
there is some moral reason not to undermine that practice (at least if it 
does not involve severe discord towards innocent parties). Development 
may indeed be faulted for running roughshod over this facet of people’s 
lives, but the ground of the criticism is that it disregards communion, 
not that it neglects God.  
4.2. Too Much Science?  
Although some of the post-development literature, particularly with an 
African flavour, is critical of science for eclipsing ‘spiritual’ ways of 
interpreting the world, as per the previous objection, there is the 
further, distinct objection that science is simply unlikely to work in a sub-
Saharan context. Consider this claim:  
Attempts to achieve high productivity are often counter-productive. And 
usually, it is those already struggling to make ends meet who pay the price 
for national gambles. Science has much to answer for in Africa in this respect. 
Africans were encouraged to use fertilizers. Many of these fertilizers were not 
tested for the particular soils in which they were being used. The result was 
that wrong types of fertilizers were used. Consequently, soils got burnt with 
the wrong salts applied to them.26 
However, this sounds like the problem is bad science or not enough 
science, rather than too much science simpliciter. A good scientist would 
have considered whether a fertilizer that works in one kind of soil would 
be likely to work in another of a different chemical composition. In 
addition, a sensible policy maker would have run a pilot study to test the 
fertilizer in one, circumscribed area, before encouraging its widespread 
adoption.  
More deeply, insofar as a communal relationship includes aid, it 
prescribes doing what is likely to make people’s lives go better, which 
includes meeting their biological, psychological and social needs. The 
scientific method has been humanity’s most successful means by which to 
                                                     
26 Sindima, ‘Community of Life’, 550. 
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understand the nature of reality, and should not be neglected when 
seeking to improve people’s quality of life. Surely, it would be wrong to 
fund any aid project intending to free up human resources in Africa by 
deploying zombies in the army,27 or to disseminate a concoction meant 
to cure HIV/AIDS that was sent by a purported spirit to a truck driver in 
a dream,28 or to harness electricity discharged by flying witches to power 
African economies.29 These projects would be unjust for a government to 
support because doing so would flout the communal value of solidarity, 
i.e., would constitute an utter failure to do what, for all we can tell with 
reliable epistemic means, is likely to enable people to live well. 
4.3. Too Much Materialism? 
More than a few in the field suggest that standard development theory is 
too materialistic for addressing solely or mainly financial, technological 
and consumerist interests. For instance, one finds the criticism that 
‘development is about paving the way for the achievement of those 
conditions that characterize rich societies: industrialization, agricultural 
modernization, and urbanization’30 or that the key problem with 
development theory is that it is focused on ‘material affluence’ and 
‘commodities’.31  
However, I do not believe that this objection is fair. An awful lot of 
contemporary development has involved seeking to improve health, 
education and human rights, which are not essentially industrial or 
economic. This is true not merely in theory, but also in practice. 
Idiosyncratic are neither Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s 
                                                     
27 Suggested by Credo Mutwa, Indaba, My Children (Repr. Edinburgh: Payback Press, 
1998), 657. 
28 Discussed in (but not endorsed by) Kerry Cullinan, ‘Health Officials Promote Untested 
uBhejane’. Health-E News 22 March 2006, https://www.health-e.org.za/2006/03/22/health-
officials-promote-untested-ubhejane/. 
29 Suggested by Munyaradzi Mawere, ‘Possibilities for Cultivating African Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems (IKSs): Lessons from Selected Cases of Witchcraft in Zimbabwe’, 
Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development 1 (2011): 91-100 at 98. 
30 Escobar, ‘Imagining a Post-Development Era?’, 25. 
31 Ziai, ‘Development Discourse and Its Critics’, 8. 
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theoretical accounts of development,32 nor the programmes designed to 
educate the police about human rights and gender issues and to help 
teachers impart literacy and numeracy and, one could add, those aimed 
at improving the health of pregnant women and of their newborns, 
enhancing nutrition amongst children, providing emergency food 
assistance, fostering immunization, combating malaria, pneumonia and 
HIV/AIDS, reducing instances of child marriages, making it easier to 
register births with the state, and creating effective asylum systems for 
refugees.33 Although below I will argue that a drive to improve people’s 
material standard of living has too often come at the cost of communal 
relationship, the present objection, that development utterly neglects 
non-economic considerations, is too crude. 
4.4. Too Little Locality? 
Often post-development theorists strongly express ‘an interest in local 
autonomy, culture and knowledge’,34 or urge us to move ‘from global 
thinking to local thinking’.35 Sometimes this is merely a concern to avoid a 
‘one size fits all’ approach, in light of the sensible points that conditions 
vary from place to place and that those on the ground are most likely to be 
aware of the particularities of their province, country or region. By this 
view, certain values or norms, such as a package of human rights, might be 
applicable to all societies, but would need to be applied differently and 
accorded differential weights, given the variation in contexts. 
However, other times the suggestion is the stronger, relativist idea 
that the local is the source of the values and norms that are appropriate 
                                                     
32 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999); Martha 
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
33 See note 9 for the source of these programmes. 
34 Escobar, ‘Imagining a Post-Development Era?’, 27. 
35 Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash, ‘From Global Thinking to Local Thinking’, in 
Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree (eds), The Post-Development Reader (London: Zed 
Books, 1997), 277-289. See also Ashish Kothari et al., ‘Buen Vivir, Degrowth and Ecological 
Swaraj: Alternatives to Sustainable Development and the Green Economy’, Development 57 
(2014): 362-375 at 368-369; and Ziai, ‘Post-Development Concepts?’, 2. 
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for it. One theorist remarks that ‘if all previous attempts at development 
have failed and reformist policies do not work, where does one begin? 
The starting point for solutions begins with cultural relativism, a 
rejection and total overhaul of that closed Western window’,36 while 
another contends that the right sort of change for people is one that 
‘could leave them free to change the rules and the contents of change, 
according to their own culturally defined ethics and aspirations’.37 Some 
explicitly ‘bite the bullet’ and reject the concept of human rights as 
inappropriate because of its implicit universal scope.38 
However, upon supposing a basic value of communion, there is 
nothing morally significant in itself about locality, construed as a source 
of views about social progress, and, furthermore, the concept of human 
rights remains vital. Treating people as special in virtue of their capacity 
to commune means avoiding severe discordance with those who have not 
misused this capacity, where human rights violations are plausibly 
precisely that, i.e., severe forms of treating innocents as separate and 
inferior, subordinating them, harming them, and doing so consequent to 
indifference to their good or even a desire to take pleasure in their pain.  
Another way to see the point is to consider that those who value 
communion would have little reason to prize localities that did not do so. 
For example, post-development theorists, or at least African ethicists, 
would generally not approve of the local as it exists in the West. They 
would instead tend to maintain that what is local there is undesirable 
(say, for undermining communion), which judgment entails that locality 
as such is not what truly motivates. For another example, suppose that a 
given non-Western culture would not allow girls to read or to be 
educated in certain subjects.39 Again, what is local would not merit 
                                                     
36 Erik Berg, ‘Post-Development Theory in Africa’, Peace Review 19 (2007): 541-554 at 544. 
37 Rahnema, ‘Towards Post-Development’, 385. 
38 E.g., Esteva and Prakash, ‘From Global Thinking to Local Thinking’, 282-285. 
39 For a similar point, about the potential clash between infant mortality and 
multiculturalism, see Ray Kiely, ‘The Last Refuge of the Noble Savage? A Critical 
Assessment of Post-Development Theory’, European Journal of Development Research 11 
(1999): 30-55. 
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funding or other kinds of support, roughly for failing to commune with 
the girls.  
4.5. Too Much Progress?  
For the fifth and final objection to development sometimes made in the 
name of African values that I argue is weak,40 note that some reject 
development because it implies linearity or progress. Sometimes this 
objection is grounded on the idea that development means indefinite 
economic growth,41 an association that I argued above is not necessary; 
in the 21st century relatively few development theorists believe that it 
should take the form of pursuing the constant expansion of the 
monetary value of goods and services. However, other times the criticism 
is not based on this merely contingent association and appears to cut to 
the heart of the concept of development. Consider these claims: 
According to Ubuntu and Buen Vivir, there is no such a thing as 
underdevelopment. Rather, the problem is social disharmony … [where the] 
primary aim is not to achieve progress, but rather to establish harmonious 
relations.42 
                                                     
40 A sixth prominent objection that I find weak is that development posits only one, and 
specifically Western, way for a society to progress. Consider, for example, the title of Serge 
Latouche, The Westernization of the World (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 1996), as well as talk of 
development theory being ‘unidirectional’ (Kothari et al., ‘Buen Vivir, Degrowth and 
Ecological Swaraj’, 366), or ‘homogenizing’ the non-West (Berg, ‘Post-Development Theory 
in Africa’, 553), or ‘universalizing Western institutions’ (Ziai, ‘Development Discourse and 
Its Critics’, 4). While I agree that there is prima facie reason to doubt that there is only one 
way for societies to progress, strong reason to doubt that the West instantiates it, and 
extremely strong reason to contend that it should not be forcibly imposed on others, this 
criticism would be much more compelling if informed by specific values that have some 
philosophical backing and concrete, plausible alternatives in light of them (at least the 
former of which I aim to provide here). For an influential critique of the lack of positive 
suggestions in post-development theory, see Jan Pieterse, ‘After Post-development’, Third 
World Quarterly 21 (2000): 175-191 at 184-186, 188. 
41 Sindima, ‘Community of Life’, 542-543; Rahnema, ‘Towards Post-Development’, 392, 
393, 400. 
42 Marianne Kuusipalo, ‘Harmony versus Progress: Development from the Perspective of 
Indigenous Worldviews’, Horn of Africa Journal 7 (2014), http://afrikansarvi.fi/72-
artikkeli/203-harmony-versus-progress. 
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The problem is not in the lack of implementation, but rather in the concept 
of development as linear … In indigenous knowledge, there is nothing 
analogous to the concept of development, often leading to a rejection of that 
idea. There is no concept of a linear process of life to establish a before and 
after state, namely underdevelopment and development, referring to the 
dichotomy in which people have to go through in order to achieve welfare, as 
in the Western world.43 
Is it true that, for indigenous African values, the concepts of progress 
and linearity are out of place?  
I believe not. Consider that, at the individual level, it is extremely 
common for indigenous Africans to invoke the maxim, ‘A person is a 
person through other persons’ (or ones like it such as ‘I am because we 
are’). Although there are descriptive senses to this phrase (to the effect 
that one’s existence and identity necessarily depend on others), there is 
also a prescriptive sense, namely, that one ought to become a real 
person, which one can do by prizing certain relationships with others.44 
Traditionally speaking, one should strive to become an ancestor, or at 
least as morally wise as one can become. Those who have utterly failed to 
exercise their capacity to commune and have acted in vicious ways are 
often labelled ‘non-persons’ or even ‘animals’. 
Now, given that the idea of self-realization or self-improvement, viz., 
moving away from being an animal (a before state) and towards 
becoming a real person (an after state), has in fact been salient in 
traditional sub-Saharan ethical thought, it is hardly a stretch to think in 
similar terms at a social level. If our aim as individuals should be to 
become good people, then a society’s aim should plausibly be to create 
good institutions, roughly ones that enable and prompt individuals to 
realize themselves as communal beings. If a society is failing to honour 
its people’s special capacity to commune, then there is a reasonable 
sense of ‘progress’ that it should be striving to achieve. 
                                                     
43 Kothari et al., ‘Buen Vivir, Degrowth and Ecological Swaraj’, 366, 367. 
44 For just one exposition, in the context of a variety of sub-Saharan peoples, see 
Mutombo Nkulu-N’Sengha, ‘Bumuntu’, in Molefi Kete Asante and Ama Mazama (eds), 
Encyclopedia of African Religion (Los Angeles: Sage, 2009), 142-147. 
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5. Strong Criticisms of Development  
Having argued that several criticisms of development theory and 
practice miss their mark, from the perspective of an Afro-communal 
normative framework, I now argue that there are three criticisms that 
are on target. I am not the first to voice these criticisms, but take my 
contribution to be showing that communion naturally provides a unitary 
ground accounting for their force.   
5.1. Too Anthropocentric 
As noted above, standard development theory and practice now routinely 
integrate a concern for the environment. However, pollution is to be 
avoided only insofar as it would harm human beings, and sustainability is 
to be pursued only in the sense of using nature now in ways that are 
consistent with the flourishing of future generations of human beings. 
These approaches to the environment do not take into account what non-
instrumental goodness or moral status exists beyond the human realm. 
‘Unless people cultivate a sense of bondedness to nature they cannot care 
about nature … Any model of transformation that does not take into 
account the value of nature does not stand a chance’.45  
The Afro-communal ethic above entails that progress ought to be 
conceived as including the fulfilment of certain direct duties towards 
those animals that can be objects of communion with us. Recall that, by 
this ethic, human beings have a full moral status insofar as they can 
commune and many animals have a partial moral status in that they can 
be communed with by us. Although our full moral status means that our 
urgent or most important interests should be favoured when they 
unavoidably conflict with those of animals, their partial moral status 
means that our trivial interests, and perhaps some of our moderate ones, 
should not be satisfied at the expense of their urgent ones in (at least) 
being free from anxiety and physical pain.  
                                                     
45 Sindima, ‘Community of Life’, 549; see also Kothari et al., ‘Buen Vivir, Degrowth and 
Ecological Swaraj’, 371. 
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Hence, a morally sound conception of social progress would be one 
that seeks to give animals their due, and does not imply that they should 
serve merely as a means to our ends. When evaluating a society, one 
ought to consider, as Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness index has for 
decades,46 how to avoid degrading non-anthropocentric values, or, in the 
relational terms favoured here, how to satisfy human interests while 
minimizing the subordination of and harm to animals capable of being 
party to communal relationships with us. A more stringent regulation, if 
not abolition, of factory farms would be a good way to start embarking 
on a more harmonious relationship with the most valuable parts of the 
natural world. As Gandhi is famous for having said, ‘The greatness of a 
nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals are 
treated’.  
5.2. Too Individualist 
Above I argued that development theory and practice cannot be faulted 
for being exclusively concerned with material, financial or economic 
considerations, as they have also routinely addressed health, education 
and human rights. What I do think is a fair criticism is the idea that a 
developmental approach to all these interests is overly individualist, by 
which I mean focused on improving goods internal to individuals and 
not giving enough weight to relational values.  
To begin to appreciate this criticism, consider that one group of 
scholars au fait with the Senegalese context have suggested that wealth 
should be identified not in terms of the number of objects acquired or 
purchasing power, but rather  
in the level of integration of people in their natural and spiritual 
environments, in the quality of their relationships with the society around 
them … If we were to evaluate the wealth of a society … according to its 
capacity to integrate and ‘include’ the greatest number of people; if we also 
                                                     
46 On which see Sabine Alkire, ‘Well-being, Happiness, and Public Policy’, Oxford Poverty 
and Human Development Initiative Research in Progress Series (2013), 41-42, 
http://www.alicerap.eu/resources/documents/cat_view/18-well-being-library.html. 
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assessed its capacity to redistribute—one would be led to conclude that many 
in the West live in a state of poverty and precariousness.47 
Similarly, consider the remark, 
If one defined violent crime, racism, suicide, isolation, alienation, 
environmental destruction and the like as major indicators of a ‘bad’ or 
‘underdeveloped’ society, the industrialized countries would hardly be at the 
top of the ‘development’ scale.48 
Taking communion to be a basic value makes good sense of these 
criticisms of development. It is plausible to think of integration as a 
matter of people identifying with and exhibiting solidarity towards 
others, and to deem problems such as crime, racism, isolation, alienation 
and the like to be the undermining of these values and the manifestation 
of their opposites in the forms of division and ill-will. 
More than a few thinkers who have been inspired by Africa and 
criticized development have pointed out that Western economic norms 
tend to undermine certain relational orientations prominent in the lives 
of indigenous sub-Saharans. Here are several examples (not intended to 
be complete):  
● the profit motive has often conflicted with the prestige motive, 
 viz., the intention to give without immediate expectation of net 
 gain or even equivalent return, common amongst indigenous 
 African peoples;49  
● relatedly, there has been a disposition amongst sub-Saharans not 
 to accumulate wealth, but rather to spend it with the expectation 
 of sustaining and deepening bonds, on which one could rely 
                                                     
47 Emmanuel N’Dione et al., ‘Reinventing the Present: The Chodak Experience in 
Senegal’, in Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree (eds), The Post-Development Reader 
(London: Zed Books, 1997), 364-376 at 369. 
48 Ziai, ‘Development Discourse and Its Critics’, 8. See also Rahnema, ‘Towards Post-
Development’, 384. 
49 N’Dione et al., ‘Reinventing the Present’, 371-372; and Munyaradzi Felix Murove, ‘The 
Incarnation of Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in Post-colonial 
African Economic Discourse’, repr. in Munyaradzi Felix Murove (ed.), African Ethics 
(Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), 221-237. 
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 down the road;50 
● rather than deploy labour-saving technology, many indigenized 
 Africans would employ their relatives and friends in an ‘economy 
 of affection’;51 
● in contrast to a banking model, it would be natural for those 
 inspired by indigenous African values to pool their resources 
 and then loan them out either without seeking interest or on a 
 profit-sharing basis;52 
● instead of those living on a plot of land being solely responsible 
 for gathering up the produce from it, all those who had 
 harvesting to do in many traditional sub-Saharan villages would 
 collectively move from field to field to help one another;53 
● rather than export goods to the global market, African traders 
 would often prefer to make goods that would benefit their 
 compatriots; there is something prima facie wrong with a 
 situation ‘where in a country with coffee crops it is impossible to 
 drink local coffee (there is only imported instant one)’;54 
● instead of conceiving of poverty as bad simply because one’s own 
 needs go unmet, one should allow for the idea that ‘the problem 
                                                     
50 Kofi Busia, The Challenge of Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 131; 
N’Dione et al., ‘Reinventing the Present’, 370; Hassan Zaoual, ‘The Economy and Symbolic 
Sites of Africa’ in Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree (eds), The Post-Development Reader 
(London: Zed Books, 1997), 30-39 at 34-36; and Murove, ‘The Incarnation of Max Weber’s 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in Post-colonial African Economic Discourse’, 
231-232. 
51 Zein-Elabdin, ‘Postcoloniality and Development’, 224-225. 
52 See discussions of South African stokvels in Dirk Louw, ‘Ubuntu and the Challenges of 
Multiculturalism in Post-apartheid South Africa’, Quest 15 (2001): 15-35 at 24-25, and of 
Senegalese tontine in Berg, ‘Post-Development Theory in Africa’, 552. 
53 See, e.g., discussion of the southern African practice of letsema in Moeketsi Letseka, 
‘African Philosophy and Educational Discourse’, in Philip Higgs et al. (eds), African Voices in 
Education (Lansdowne: Juta, 2000), 179-193 at 183-184, 189-190. 
54 Lubieniecka, ‘Does Post-development Theory Find Alternatives to Westernization of 
International Relations?’, 11-12. 
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 with being poor is that I don’t have anything to give to others’,55 
 which entails making allowance for some transferable goods, or 
 at least those that can be shared by more than one agent at a 
 time, and not merely goods that are non-transferable and 
 indivisible; 
● rather than focus solely or mainly on money or commodities as 
 what to ensure are distributed, goods or services to prioritize in 
 light of African values would include couples counselling, 
 women’s shelters, parenting classes, quality day care, 
 rehabilitation programmes, neighbourhood parks and festivals, 
 densification in spacious neighbourhoods, job training, non-
 exploitive labour relations and grassroots organizations;56 
● rather than permit great inequalities of wealth, even if they were 
 to the marginal financial benefit of the worst-off, many in the 
 African tradition would find reason to reduce them so as to 
 avoid envy and to foster a greater sense of togetherness.57 
The literature on African values features mainly these kinds of economic 
examples where development would appear to come at the cost of 
relationship, but it is worth noting parallel cases in the spheres of 
healthcare, education and human rights. Extending the criticism in 
these ways is important in order to clarify that an essential problem with 
development is not so much materialism, but rather the deeper and 
broader problem of individualism. So, for example, consider the view 
that a family has a right to be informed about the sickness of one of its 
members, or at least that a person has a duty to inform them about his 
                                                     
55 A remark from an elderly South African woman made at an imbizo (discussion between 
leaders and their community) on the topic of ubuntu and poverty, quoted by Thaddeus 
Metz, ‘An African Theory of Dignity and a Relational Conception of Poverty’, in John de 
Gruchy (ed.), The Humanist Imperative in South Africa (Stellenbosch: African Sun Media, 
2011), 233-241 at 238. 
56 Argued in Metz, ‘An African Theory of Dignity and a Relational Conception of Poverty’. 
57 Magesa, African Religion, 278; and Henry Odera Oruka, Practical Philosophy (Nairobi: 
East African Educational Publishers, 1997), 120. 
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sickness and hence how his ability to help them might be impaired.58 
Such an approach to confidentiality conflicts with the dominant 
approach in the West, which treats information about health as the 
patient’s private information.  
Or think about the idea that one proper aim of education is to 
enculturate, i.e., to transmit and enrich a local way of life that has been 
central to a people’s self-conception for a long time.59 Such a concern to 
support an instance of communion contrasts with the view of education 
salient in the West, that its aim should be merely or mainly to enable 
students to rationally choose in cosmopolitan fashion from amongst a 
variety of global possibilities. 
Finally, with respect to human rights, notice that several prominent 
African political philosophers have argued that democratic political 
power would be best allocated on a consensual basis, so that, for 
example, a statute should be considered valid only if all 
Parliamentarians agreed to its adoption.60 Such diverges from the 
ubiquitious system in the West, where political parties are allowed to 
push through statutes based on majority rule, which is much more 
competitive and exclusionary. 
These examples of prima facie plausible forms of relationality in the 
realms of healthcare, education and human rights could be multiplied. I 
submit that the value of communion as sketched above does a powerful 
job of explaining how typical development strategies often objectionably 
come at the expense of relational goods. Note, however, that I am not 
suggesting that there is conclusive reason to deem all these specific 
relational examples to be appropriate; they need to be weighed against 
                                                     
58 E.g., Peter Kasenene, ‘African Ethical Theory and the Four Principles’, in Robert Veatch 
(ed.), Cross-Cultural Perspectives in Medical Ethics (Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett, 2000), 347-
357 at 349-356. 
59 E.g., Ivy Goduka, ‘African/Indigenous Philosophies: Legitimizing Spiritually Centered 
Wisdoms within the Academy’, in Philip Higgs et al. (eds), African Voices in Education 
(Lansdowne: Juta, 2000), 63-83. 
60 For just one influential example, see Kwasi Wiredu, ‘Democracy by Consensus’, 
Philosophical Papers 30 (2001): 227-244. 
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more competitive or otherwise atomistic mechanisms that might be 
expected to improve people’s quality of life substantially, thereby 
realizing solidarity of a sort (between institutions and the people they 
ought to serve), even if at some cost to interpersonal identity and face-to-
face mutual aid. 
5.3. Too Technocratic 
For the third criticism of development that I believe is incisive, consider 
that even those who question post-development theory tend to grant that 
one of its purportedly negative characterizations of development theory 
and practice is correct: ‘Development thinking is steeped in social 
engineering and the ambition to shape economies and societies, which 
makes it an interventionist and managerialist discipline’.61 The literature 
abounds with bitter criticism of development ‘experts’ and ‘managers’ 
who advise and oversee programmes, occluding more democratic 
approaches, say, where intended beneficiaries would be involved in the 
construction of the programmes.  
As has been recently noted, ‘the importance of “participation” has 
been taken on board, at least nominally, by the major international 
development agencies’.62 The question that remains is whether the logic 
of development theory can adequately explain why participation is 
morally important.  
The central developmental rationale for participation is one of 
efficiency: without input from the poor, a programme intended to 
benefit them would be less likely to work. Generally speaking, people 
best know their own interests and how to realize them, a point that John 
Stuart Mill is famous for having invoked in his political philosophy. And, 
so, a development theorist might reasonably contend that consultation 
                                                     
61 Pieterse, ‘After Post-Development’, 182; see also Ziai, ‘Development Discourse and Its 
Critics’, 8-9; and James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development,’ Depoliticization and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
62 Stephen Devereux and J. Allister McGregor, ‘Transforming Social Protection’, European 
Journal of Development Research 26 (2014): 296-310 at 299. 
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with intended beneficiaries is normally vital in order to be able to ensure 
that a programme will indeed help them.  
However, there are two problems with this rationale for participation. 
First, it is not always the case that consultation with the poor would assist 
in doing what is most likely to help them. Sometimes policy-makers and 
activists can be in a position to know on their own what would be good 
for others. After all, imagine the poor’s lack of education were to get in 
the way and cause problems when trying to craft an effective 
programme; in such a case, if a top-down approach would likely produce 
marginally better outcomes for the poor in the long run, the logic of 
development theory would justify it. 
Second, a requirement to consult with the poor does not seem 
reducible to mere considerations of efficiency. There is intuitively some 
moral reason to include the poor that is independent of the epistemic 
consequences of doing so. There is something about a participative 
process that matters in itself or for its own sake when it comes to justice; 
there would be reason to consult with intended beneficiaries even were it 
the case that their lack of education would make it more difficult to help 
them. 
Now, considerations of communion naturally give substantial moral 
weight to the procedure by which programmes are undertaken. The way 
that goods or services are distributed must be done in a way that esteems 
relationships of identity and solidarity. It is the former element that does 
real work in the present context; for identifying with others is roughly a 
matter of enjoying a sense of togetherness and engaging in joint 
projects. These factors have an intrinsic significance for morally sound 
relationships distinct from caring (doing what is likely to improve 
people’s quality of life), and they make good sense of why there is strong 
moral reason for programmes to be participatory, beyond considerations 
of efficiency. Participation could range from consultation to cooperation 
or, as one scholar has forcefully suggested, to the provision of resources 
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to enable the poor to undertake their own, grassroots projects.63 
6. Conclusion: Towards a Relational Concept of Progress 
I have argued that, even upon detaching talk of ‘development’ from the 
aim of indefinite economic growth, there are three key respects in which 
its characteristic theory and practice remain morally questionable. 
Specifically, they are still overly anthropocentric, individualist and 
technocratic. The African value of communion qua identity and solidarity 
provides a normative theoretical ground for making these three 
criticisms and for prescribing a different form of progress, one that 
includes relating to certain animals as ends, that does not invariably 
trade-off relational goods for non-relational ones, and that includes a 
participatory dimension at its core.  
One major question at this point is how to speak about the direction 
in which a society ought to move. Some would characterize the relational 
values sketched in this article as informing an ‘African development’.64 
However, if I am correct that for more than 60 years the word 
‘development’ has signified an anthropocentric, individualist and 
technocratic approach, then such a phrase would be a contradiction in 
terms (supposing that ‘African’ signified communion). Although there 
would be something appealing about composing an article that invokes 
the value of communion and sports the title ‘How the West Is 
Underdeveloped’, I am more inclined to let talk of ‘development’ go and 
instead to work with a different vocabulary.  
Contra many in the post-development movement, I do not also 
eschew talk of ‘progress’ or the concept of linearity. Central to the 
                                                     
63 Sally Matthews, ‘What, Then, Should We Do? Insights and Experiences of a Senegalese 
NGO’, in Aram Ziai (ed.), Exploring Post-Development (New York: Routledge, 2007), 131-
144. 
64 In addition to Prah, ‘Culture’, see Martin Ajei, Africa’s Development: The Imperative of 
Indigenous Knowledge and Values (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2011); and 
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African ethical tradition has been the view that people ought over time 
to become real persons, often construed in terms of their capacity to 
relate to others in certain, social ways. Since it makes sub-Saharan sense 
to say that some, immoral individuals live akin to animals and that they 
ought to mature, by working to manifest their genuinely human-
communal features, undesirable societies seem aptly construed as those 
in which it is difficult for people to do so and in which key institutions 
instead flout the value of communion. From this perspective, a bad 
society is roughly one tends to produce bad lives, ones that are inhuman 
for their relationships too often being anti-social or discordant.  
In sum, instead of ‘growth’ or ‘development’, perhaps we should try 
talk of ‘humanization’. And since the West has not done a particularly 
good job of humanizing its institutions and relationships more generally, 
and since communion has not been a salient foundational value in its 
moral-political philosophy, the default respect in which the West ought 
to seek to aid Africa is by providing resources with which it could take 
the lead in enabling its people to become real people by communing 
with other people (and animals).65 
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